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Abstract 
Although the Cold War was thought to be a part of history, Russia has in recent 
years increased their military capacity and activity which is interpreted by the 
West as a threat which needs to be addressed. This study aims to present how 
Sweden has changed its view regarding Russia with time and also to explain why 
this change has occurred. Although Russia may be constituting a larger threat now 
than ever since the end of the Cold War, this study uses indicia argumentation a 
long with theories such as framing, Mearsheimer’s theories about lying in 
international politics and prospect theory to argue that Sweden is implementing a 
media strategy in order to prepare themselves for an unpredictable future, where 
threats are exaggerated in order to gain advocacy for one’s policies. By comparing 
and analyzing material collected from the years 2005-2015, I will conclude that 
this change is clearly visible over the years with, for instance, increased reporting 
in the media regarding military activity close to Swedish borders and changed 
frame in the declarations of foreign policy. Russia may constitute a threat, but the 
Swedish state is also using this insecurity to change the domestic opinion for its 
policies. 
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1 Introduction  
With the Cold War at an end, a new time of liberal values and durable 
peace was in sight. But the last couple of years has changed such 
optimism. Sweden had its territorial frontier violated by Russian 
aircraft more than once and they actively train their aircraft units in 
areas close to Swedish borders. Swedish media has reported 
extensively about these occurrences with detailed information and 
statements from Swedish officials. One known example is the one 
which occurred in October during 2013. Russian aircraft bombers then 
flew close to Swedish borders without consulting the Swedish military 
unit first, which were perceived as an offensive move by Russia (SVT 
2013-11-06). It is apparent that Russian activity is not going unnoticed 
but posed as an active threat and is influencing foreign policy making. 
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
In this study it is argued that the Swedish state is actively managing 
the Russian threat, and one part is to gain domestic support for 
policies which affect military capacity and potential alliances. The 
purpose of this paper is to present and explain the changed attitude 
Sweden has had towards Russia over the years. This requires an 
empirical study which will test if this kind of media strategy, which 
also other countries use to garner advocacy, exists. The question 
therefore becomes: 
 
Has the Swedish state changed its view of Russia during the last 10 
years? 
- Why is that? 
 
The reason why the question doesn’t include the ‘change in Swedish 
media climate’, but only the Swedish state, is because the premise of 
this paper is that the information which media receives about the 
Russian military is based on information released from the state. It is 
hard to imagine that papers could gain any information of this kind 
without the help of the state. During the course of this paper, it will 
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become clear that there are more countries than Russia which violate 
the Swedish border, and those countries do it without media 
consequences or at least without being labeled as a national threat. 
Russia has been conducting exercises around Swedish borders before, 
but Swedish media sometimes report about it and sometimes they 
don’t. This case study will focus on how Swedish media reports have 
changed along with how the foreign policy protocol has changed over 
the years. Essentially the core puzzle here is that sometimes the 
Swedish state release information to the press and during other periods 
it don’t, and by studying the Swedish media along with declarations of 
foreign policy during different periods we can determine when Russia 
is posed as a threat and when it is not, and eventually this study will 
try to explain why this is. Media is an excellent tool to spread different 
kinds of information and to develop different frames of opinion 
amongst the people. Politicians realize this and use this tool in order 
gain advocacy for their policies. 
1.1.1 Existing Research 
This kind of study is not the first of its kind. The case of advocacy has 
long been relevant in the political science field and therefore related 
research is easy to find. One example of research made after the war 
had passed is Lunch’s and Sperlich’s paper about public opinion 
during the Vietnam War. This paper provided insight in how public 
opinion changed over the years and why USA lost its support for 
involvement in the region. It concludes that there is a relationship 
between the public and foreign policy, and leaders need to bring this 
into their calculations when making policies (Lunch & Sperlich, 1979, 
p. 43). The Iraq War, which is a more recent example, have a large 
number to studies which focus on the process of changing opinion 
over the years. USA then tried to sell the Iraq War to its public by 
deceiving them with the information it released (Mearsheimer, 2011, 
p. 62). As time has proven, they were successful in selling the Iraq 
War at the time. One might draw the conclusion that leaders have 
learned with time how to gain and maintain support from the public. 
Other studies regarding specifically Swedish view of Russia during 
this period are hard to find. This is most likely the case because it is 
new and still ongoing.  
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1.1.2 Disposition 
 
Forthcoming are different parts which divide the study into necessary 
sections which process the theoretical problem at hand. Chapter 2 is 
the heart of the entire paper, since it is where design, method and 
material is presented and discussed. This section is essential because it 
will determine what kind of conclusion one can draw from the chosen 
research approach. Chapter 3 will present the theories which will later 
be applied in order to explain and solve the puzzle which the research 
question presented. But this cannot be done without the empirical 
material. The empirical chapter will therefore be chapter 4, but this 
section will also be the chapter of analysis. Chapter 5 then consists of 
a discussion regarding the content of chapter 4, and in chapter 6 there 
are concluding remarks. Lastly, chapter 7 contains bibliography.  
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2 Method 
The ambition is that this paper is done with intersubjectivity so that 
anyone can recreate this study, and therefore a presentation of the 
methodological framework is needed. The design of this paper will be 
a descriptive and comparative case study with ambition to connect the 
empirical data to a set of theories to explain the behavior of Swedish 
foreign policy. When this study is carried out, it will be done humbly 
with the knowledge that any explanation of the dependent variable, 
change in Sweden’s view of Russia, is not as simple as to be 
understood from a couple of theories, which also mainly focus on the 
state as a unit and not as much on individual actors (Teorell & 
Svensson, 2007, p. 31). Other studies could therefore study the same 
subject from different designs and theoretical lenses to contribute to a 
more comprehensive view. This study will be limited to Russian 
military action and its frame development between 2005 and 2015. 
There are a large number of countries cooperating and practicing their 
aircraft unit with Sweden, but none which are perceived as a threat, 
although other countries also fly into Swedish airspace without 
permission. This is often perceived as accidents and not intended to 
imply as to having an offensive attitude towards Sweden, and is 
therefore not labeled as a violation. 
 
The aim is to first describe the Swedish frame of Russia at hand by 
first presenting material regarding this over the years in order to 
analyze and compare both the frames and Swedish state behavior. The 
empirical ground is the pillars which are of fundamental importance to 
be able to make a decent analysis. The information gathered will be 
used to explain the dependent variable: Swedish foreign policy action 
(Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 23, 29). Questions which one can keep 
in mind throughout the entire paper are: 
 
 How is Russia perceived? Or is it perceived in any particular way? 
 Does Sweden’s attitude towards Russia change over the years? 
 If there is a clear change in attitude, why is that?  
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These questions very much relate to the main research question of this 
paper, and should be thought of as guidelines which helps the reader 
to be critical of the reliability and validity of the paper. 
 
The theoretical section consist of a set of theories which will be used 
to try to analyze the collected empirical material at hand. This will be 
carried out as a deductive case study which uses theory to explain the 
phenomenon rather than to test and develop new theories. Since the 
ambition is to study a wide range of cases but still only answer if and 
how there has been a change in attitude towards Russia, it is not clear 
whether this study will be purely intensive or extensive, but rather 
somewhere in between. This study have the ambition to generalize the 
result and to present change in media strategy over the years, but also 
describe and explain cases during this time period for a deeper 
understanding of how the nature of the reports has changed. The 
results of this study both have scientific and non-scientific relevance. 
There is scientific relevance because the study will provide deeper 
knowledge of Swedish foreign policy, and non-scientific because of 
the same reason (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 18, 48-49, 69). 
2.1.1 Validity, Reliability and Limitations 
The analysis and the effort to explain the research question will be 
made with indicia argumentation. In other words, this study will not 
contain inside information from within the state which divulge that 
there is a new media strategy which is conducted in order to garner 
support for a policy which seeks to increase military strength. Rather, 
the empirical material will be the confirming factor whether there is a 
change in opinions regarding Russia, and the theories will analyze in 
order to draw the conclusion of whether it is plausible that a new 
media strategy is being implemented in order to change the public 
opinion intentionally. Theoretical definitions will be provided in the 
theoretical section which will determine how to interpret and analyze 
the media reports and declarations. The information gathered will be 
used to measure how Sweden’s view of Russia has changed over the 
years with the theoretical definitions, which provides validity. My 
operational indicators goes hand in hand with the theoretical 
definitions. Framing, for instance, regards how information is 
presented, and this paper study changes during a 10 year period by 
looking at change in the information flow over time both content-wise 
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and statistically (Esaiasson et al, 2007, p. 57). The other theories will 
then conclude from this why it is presented in this way.   
 
This paper have certain limitations which does not only concern time 
and space in the making of this study. One of these is the fact that this 
study concerns an ongoing event in the world today, and not a study of 
history where a lot information can be collected afterwards. This study 
also lacks inside information which is not released by the state, which 
limits the strength of the conclusion which this kind of study can 
draw. The relationship between media and the state is also one which 
can’t be proven, but the empirical connection and the theories ensure 
that this is not stated without support. The data that is available will be 
collected according to principles such as specific search words and 
controlled content to ensure reliability and avoid systematical error 
(Esaiasson et al, 2007, p. 63). It is acknowledged that the search words 
will determine the outcome of which information is used, therefore the 
words are chosen carefully to subdue the amount of systematical error.   
2.1.2 Material 
 
The material will consist of media reporting and the foreign policy 
protocols from meetings which are conducted every year by the 
Swedish government. News agencies and news organizations have the 
policy of reporting information with neutrality and objectivity, but this 
is not to say that this policy isn’t violated once in a while. This is not 
necessarily because of a conscious bias, but because remaining neutral 
is hard if even possible (Dulic, 2011, p. 49). But this kind of study 
also faces other sets of difficulties which need to be addressed. Even 
the country with the lowest level of censorship and media restriction 
will try to control the information which is available to the public in 
one way or another. The incitement for this can be of strategic 
importance. But this does not mean that there is nothing to analyze, 
quite the opposite (Öberg & Sollenberg, 2011, p. 55). To be aware of 
the control over information is a key to understand government 
activity. This will be done with humility to the fact it is near 
impossible to draw any clear conclusions regarding what the Swedish 
government’s real intentions are, but with enough information the 
study can at least tell what has changed and with the help of the 
theories which are used it might be able to explain the behavior 
through indications.  
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It is also important to point out the fact that the focus here is on 
Swedish media, and that the ambition of this paper is not to gain a 
comprehensive view of media reporting around the world, or even a 
detailed study of all media reporting in Sweden regarding Russian 
military activity. Rather, this study will purposely aim to convey when 
Swedish media has and hasn’t reported about Russia and how it is 
framed, alongside with declarations of foreign policy released by the 
Swedish government. The media sources used for deeper analysis in 
this paper are Sveriges Television (SVT), and Dagens Nyheter (DN). 
Aftonbladet and Expressen will also be used, but only for statistical 
purposes. This limitation is motivated by the unfortunate lack of time 
and space, but also because these are four of the larger media sources 
in Sweden which have the capability to reach out to the entire 
population. It is arguably favorable to have those kinds of media 
sources than local newspapers. The declarations will be gathered from 
the years 2005, 2010, and 2015, while news articles will be gathered 
from each year between 2005 and 2015.  
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3 Theory 
There are basic premises which need to be addressed in order to 
understand how the theories of this study are chosen. In a democracy, 
the state need support from the people in order to be able to 
implement their policies and the actors within the state plan how this 
should be carried out (Mintz & DeRouen Jr., 2010, p. 150, 166). For 
instance, if country A wanted to go to war with country B, it would be 
troublesome if the state faced opposition within domestic borders. It 
can affect different parts of the entities of a society, all from the 
economic sector to the legitimized authority. If the leaders lose their 
support, other potential candidates could even use this to try to obtain 
that support in order to gain leader position. This means that leaders 
need to strategically convey information in a way that makes the 
policy seem favorable (Mearsheimer, 2011, p. 21-22). Otherwise a 
country might end up with a situation like USA did during the 
Vietnam War. The war met great opposition by the home public and 
the troops were withdrawn after escalating negative attitudes towards 
the involvement (Lunch & Sperlich, 1979, p. 43).  
 
Politicians are aware of the democratic system and its rules, so they 
strategically release information to the media and in the end the public 
in order to gain advocacy for certain policies (Hague & Harrop, 2010, 
p. 150). Besides that, the state needs to survive in an anarchic system 
where the tool for ensuring ones continued sovereignty is acting 
strategically through military capability and alliances. If the state of 
Sweden perceives Russia as a threat, the logical move is that Sweden 
does everything in its might to ensure that they can handle this threat. 
This can be through military capability, but also by joining or 
participating in alliances, e.g. NATO. Mearsheimer’s neorealist 
assumptions shed light on the main point in this argument; in the 
anarchic system there is no higher authority than the state, and it is 
necessary to mainly rely on self-help in a world where you have 
responsibility for your own survival (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 31-33). 
The state needs support in order to do this, and here is where media 
strategy comes into play.  
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A couple of theories will be tested in order to explain Swedish foreign 
policy behavior. First framing is presented. Framing is used to analyze 
how facts are presented by media and leaders. The reason leaders need 
to use different angles of information is because public support is 
needed in order to maintain power (Mintz & DeRouen Jr. 2009, p. 
150). Then we have Mearsheimer’s theories about lying in 
international politics. Leaders sometimes lie for strategic purposes, 
and this will be useful for my analysis (Mearsheimer, 2011, p. 11). 
The important point to Mearsheimer’s theories are not to actually 
reveal a lie made by Swedish officials, but rather to connect how and 
why leaders lie with framing in order to be able to comprehend the 
totality. Lastly, prospect theory is introduced, which is a psychological 
theory of decision making which argues that people have different 
views on taking risks depending on the gains and losses at hand 
(Mintz & DeRouen Jr. 2009, p. 75). This theory is relevant to explain 
how the public can become more prone to accept that more money is 
spent on defense. 
3.1.1 Framing  
 
Framing can be understood as a way to present issues in order to gain 
favorable reactions and opinions from an audience. For instance, in 
order to gain support for a certain policy one might frame the situation 
as one which need policy change in that direction. If our politicians 
were to promote a change in our opinion regarding climate change, 
they might display the situation in a way that makes it seem that it has 
taken a frightful turn to the worse over the years, thus demanding 
immediate policy changes in order to maintain a sustainable earth for 
future generations. Whether or not the threat is exaggerated, we can’t 
know for certain. In some cases we have the benefit of having 
foolproof scientific evidence, and climate change tends to have 
scientifically supported opinions. But in the case of military threats, 
the situation is not quite the same. The perceived threat is nothing 
which scientists in a lab can assert, and which anyone can calculate in 
order to gain a correct assessment. This is favorable to politicians, 
since it means that they can both exaggerate and undermine the threat 
to the public, depending on which strategy is favorable to the situation 
(Mintz & DeRouen Jr, 2010, p. 149-150). Framing is often used by 
not only politicians, but media, lawyers and even everyday citizens. 
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Robert Entman uses in his book ‘Projections of Power’ a definition of 
framing which will be used in this paper: 
“Selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and 
making connections among them so as to promote a particular 
interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution.” (Entman, 2004, p. 5) 
 
 
Fig. 1 Cascading Network Activation 
 
By viewing this model, one can imagine how the process of framing is 
constructed. Although framing can go both ways according to the 
model, this study will primarily focus on elite and administration 
influence on the public and media, rather than the other way around 
(Entman, 2004, p. 10). This study will focus on a Swedish version of 
the model, but it is rather the principles of the model which are 
relevant, and they are in every way applicable to Sweden as well. The 
premise of this paper is that all information which is spread regarding 
Russian military activity towards Sweden origins from the state. 
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3.1.2 Mearsheimer’s theories 
 
According to Mearsheimer’s theories of lying in international politics, 
leaders usually lie because of strategic reasons rather than being 
corrupt or craven. And when they do lie, it is usually to their own 
public (Mearsheimer, 2011, p. 12). There are three kinds of deceptive 
behavior or tactics which leaders use in order to not present “a 
straightforward or comprehensive description of events” 
(Mearsheimer, 2011, p. 15). Lying is the act of making up facts which 
one knows are not true or simply denying facts that to one’s 
knowledge are true.  But it is also when an individual uses facts, true 
or not true, in order to knowingly imply that the situation is in a 
certain way which is not in accord with reality. The relevant principle 
here is not whether the information given is truthful or not, but 
whether the leader who speaks knowingly is spreading false 
information. Spinning is when certain facts are emphasized or 
deemphasized in order to make the mental image of the receiver 
perceive the leader in a positive way. It is simply about telling the 
story so that it fits one’s position, linking together facts and 
information with exaggeration or distortion so that it is told in an 
advantageous way. Concealment is the last deceptive tactic which 
speaks a lot for itself. It is when information which can damage one’s 
position is being kept away from the public (Mearsheimer, 2011, p. 
15-18).  
 
This kind of deceptive behavior can be used in different ways to 
achieve strategic interests. Two types of these will be the focus in this 
paper. Firstly, we have fearmongering which is when a leader tells 
his/her own people lies regarding a foreign policy threat by 
exaggerating it in order to make the public appreciate the threat so that 
necessary actions can be taken, which in the end serves the national 
interest. As might become apparent to the reader, this behavior is 
neither selfish nor malign, but strategically relevant for the national 
interest. (Mearsheimer, 2011, p. 45-46, 55-56). Secondly we have 
liberal lies which are told in order to disguise “illiberal actions with 
idealistic rhetoric” (Mearsheimer, 2011, p. 23). The norms of 
acceptable and unacceptable forms of state behavior during different 
situation are generally clear and can be reflected in the international 
law and liberal ideology. But even if a state tries to act according to 
these norms, a state might be inclined to act in a way which denies 
them. At those times, leaders try to mask what they are doing by 
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inventing lies which motivates their behavior and/or conceals their 
true actions (Mearsheimer, 2011, p. 77-78).  
3.1.3 Prospect Theory 
 
Prospect theory is relevant to explain decision making in relation to 
risks to loss and gain. When the information regarding a situation is 
framed, it can be done in a way which influences the decision 
outcome, this is called the editing phase. Then the evaluation phase 
takes place, in which a decision is made. During the first phase, one is 
introduced to the decision and the options are presented, and 
according to this theory “avoiding loss is more important than 
securing gain” (Mintz & DeRouen Jr. 2009, p. 75-76). In times of 
decision, people might be reluctant to take risks with respect to gains 
for their decision, but are at the same more likely to take risks with 
respect to potential losses. Depending of the perceived level of gains 
and loss, the decision outcome differ (Mintz & DeRouen Jr. 2009, p. 
76).  
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4 Empirical data and Analysis 
The aim in this section is to shed light onto the question if there have 
been any changes over the years in Sweden’s view of Russia and why 
this is. By reviewing Swedish foreign policy declarations and media 
coverage over the years it will become clear when and how Russia is 
relevant.  
4.1.1 Foreign Policy Declarations  
 
First, the foreign policy declarations will be presented. This type of 
document is released every year and is presented in the Swedish 
Parliament by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The content presents, or 
rather explains, how the Swedish state perceives the world and how it 
intends to act on the international arena (Regeringen 2015). For this 
paper, declarations which are used were released between 2005 and 
2015. A paragraph in a declaration might look like this:  
 
Sweden wants to strengthen its cooperation with Russia. Sweden will 
continue to strive for a policy that is as clear in its demands for 
respect for international law as in its support for the right of every 
country to determine its own future. Sweden’s security policy remains 
firmly in place. Threats to peace and to our security are best averted 
collectively and in cooperation with other countries. 
 
These declarations can be said to be understood in two ways. The first 
way is to interpret the content in its literal sense. The readers who 
interpret the paragraph in this way may conclude the following: 
Sweden and Russia are working on their relationship. Sweden 
promotes international law and condemns wrong-doers. Sweden will 
in time of need seek alliance with other countries. 
 
For other readers, there is a ‘read-between-the-lines’-mentality which 
interpret what is actually being said. There is a more subtle, yet not 
unrecognizable, meaning to some sentences which implies how 
Sweden in reality perceives the world. This kind of language is 
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fundamental to understand how the policy makers think. This is an 
example of how one might understand the text above with this kind of 
lens: Sweden will continue to try to maintain a neutral tone with 
Russia and cooperate with it as long as it suits Swedish interest. If 
Russia acts in a way that is a threat to Sweden and/or works against 
Swedish interest, Sweden can point to the violations of international 
law and liberal values to condemn them in media and on an 
international level, both to their own population and to other countries 
and leaders. This can be used to justify taking sides against Russia if it 
comes to that, but since this is so far not the case, Sweden will 
continue not to openly frame Russia as a real threat. Instead 
diplomatic language is used. Diplomatic language is defined as 
“acting in a way that does not cause offense” by Cambridge 
Dictionaries Online (Cambrigde 2015). This is very true in this case. 
Sweden does not want to provoke Russia or lose any possibility to 
maintain peaceful relations with them, but if current circumstances 
change to the worse, Sweden will not hesitate to partake in an alliance 
against Russia.  
 
This line of argumentation is to be done with caution. Interpretations 
may vary and since diplomatic language is gingerly in character, it is 
impossible to draw clear-cut conclusion regarding to what is meant in 
some cases. But by observing what is mentioned and how it is 
constructed in text, one can draw conclusions about what the intention 
of it is with framing theory. In this study, declarations from the year 
2005, 2010 and 2015 will be presented and analyzed, so declarations 
from every year between 2005 and 2015 will not be used. This is 
because there is a need to detect clear changes over time and therefore 
it is not necessarily relevant to analyze every year. Also, there is a 
need to thoroughly read these declarations, and restraining the 
material becomes necessary because there is limited time and space in 
the making of this study. The declarations will be presented in 
chronological order, and will be analyzed below each year. 
4.1.2 2005 
 
“These new threats require a broadened concept of security. They 
require a security policy that focuses on the protection and rights of 
the individual, and on international law. They require an active foreign 
policy. During the Cold War it was said that foreign policy is our first 
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line of defence. This line now runs through Afghanistan, Africa, the 
Balkans and other places where Sweden is participating in missions to 
promote peace and in active development cooperation.” (p. 2) 
 
“Cooperation with Russia is a cornerstone in security work in our 
common vicinity. We have well-developed regional cooperation that 
is helping to bring Russia closer to Sweden, the Nordic countries and 
the EU. Sweden wants to deepen cooperation with Russia. We want 
Russia to be more involved in global issues. It was important that 
Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol. We are working to facilitate free 
trade between the EU and Russia. We share the commitment to the 
problems facing Russia, including the threat of terrorism. We 
witnessed the terrorist action in Beslan with great dismay. A 
precondition for deepened cooperation is that the Russian government 
ensures that democratic development in the country moves in the right 
direction and breaches of human rights cease. The situation in 
Chechnya must be solved by a political process.” (p. 8) 
 
“This is why we are working in the EU to promote peace and manage 
crises. The EU is undertaking crisis management in Africa, the Middle 
East, Southern Caucasus and the Balkans. Sweden is taking part in all 
EU operations. But we must be able to respond more rapidly, not least 
when the UN needs support. This is why we are proud that Sweden, 
together with Finland, Norway and Estonia, will shortly be able to 
establish a military rapid reaction force in the EU. During 2005, the 
Government will increase the allocation for participation in 
peacekeeping operations, including longer-term missions led by the 
UN, the EU or NATO.” (p. 9-10) 
 
“Sweden does not participate in military alliances. At the same time, 
NATO is an important partner to Sweden when it comes to efforts in 
crisis areas. We are continuing to contribute forces for NATO/PfP 
operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. In May Sweden is 
hosting a ministerial meeting within the framework of the partnership 
with NATO, which will provide an opportunity to discuss current 
security policy challenges in this extensive forum.” (p. 11) 
 
(Regeringen 2005-02-09, p. 2, 8-11) 
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Analysis 
 
This declaration from 2005 is seemingly clear from any framing 
biases which would imply that Russia is a potential enemy of Sweden. 
If one would imagine potential outcomes which are implied by these 
declarations as hypothetical doors which leads to different outcomes, 
the doors which are presented here opens up for closer ties and better 
relationship, although an unchanged and even stern outcome is also 
possible. The West makes it clear that they want Russia to sign 
agreements which would change their policies and in the end adhere 
to more liberal characteristics. Sweden on paper wants to maintain 
neutral status, but in its behavior Sweden is closing ties with 
partnerships and military actions.   
 
Nevertheless, the view Sweden is spreading to the public is one where 
Russia isn’t a threat, and at this point it would be logical if there were 
less or none media reporting regarding hostile Russian military 
activity in relation to Sweden. If there was any of such, Swedish 
officials are probably likely to either lie, spin and conceal these facts 
in a way which maintain a non-hostile view of Russia amongst the 
public, because it at the time didn’t serve the national interest. 
According to prospect theory, this also makes sense. If there isn’t a 
potential escalating situation at hand where Sweden is forced into a 
corner and has to choose between being defeated or stand up for their 
own sovereignty, anyone would want to maintain the stability at hand 
in order to avoid major loss. Sweden could have begun the process of 
strengthening its military capability and started a campaign in order to 
foster support for military alliances and mask Russia as an enemy as 
early as 2005, but it at this point didn’t serve national interest. The 
reader should keep in mind that the Russian invasion of Georgia 2008 
and the occurrences in Ukraine 2014 were yet to happen at this point. 
4.1.3 2010 
 
“Membership of the European Union means that Sweden is part of a 
political alliance and takes its share of responsibility, in the spirit of 
solidarity, for Europe’s security. Sweden will not remain passive if 
another EU Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an 
attack. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is 
similarly affected. For Sweden, which has chosen to take a place at the 
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heart of European cooperation, this is a natural and desirable 
development, just as it is natural and desirable to work to ensure that 
the EU’s voice is heard more clearly throughout the world. This is the 
best way to safeguard our values and national interests in an 
increasingly complex world.” (p. 2) 
 
“Cooperation with South Caucasus must also be strengthened. 
Georgia’s territorial integrity and democratic development are also 
important to the wider region. Sweden welcomes the Russian 
President’s statements on the importance of a functioning rule of law 
and an extensive modernisation of Russian society. We hope that it 
will soon be possible to welcome Russia too as a member of the 
WTO.” (p. 5) 
 
(Regeringen 2010-02-17, p. 2, 5)  
 
Analysis 
 
Now the frame differs a bit. Russia isn’t directly pointed out as an 
enemy of Sweden (and probably won’t be until it becomes necessary 
for the state to do so), but it is more clear here that Georgie 2008 had 
effects on European security as a whole. One can imagine that the 
countries of Europe in general fear that Russia will increase its 
military capability and become a hegemon in the region. The more 
military activity and capability that Russia show off, the more the 
West will consider them a threat and potentially harmful in the future. 
This would also be why it becomes relevant for Sweden to present 
doors which lead to deepened ties with West. These quotes from the 
declaration pretty much speak for themselves:  
 
“Sweden will not remain passive if another EU Member State or 
Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack. We expect these 
countries to act in the same way if Sweden is similarly affected.” 
(Regeringen, 2010, p. 2) 
 
“This is the best way to safeguard our values and national interests in 
an increasingly complex world.” (Regeringen, 2010, p. 2) 
 
Still, Sweden states and actively works on closer ties with Russia in its 
rhetoric, and is probably open for this as well as long as Russia isn’t 
crossing lines of both borders and international law. It is still too early 
for Sweden to conclude if Russia is a future enemy and if it should 
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jump into an alliance with West, but it certainly keeps a sharp eye on 
Russia. The Swedish consideration that it is necessary to “safeguard 
our values” is something that can be linked to Mearsheimer’s theory 
of liberal lies. It is also reasonable to assume that countries use liberal 
rhetoric preemptively as well to motivate their future position and 
behavior.  
4.1.4 2015 
 
“We share a common destiny, and we do so at a time of greater 
insecurity. When this chamber debated foreign policy a year ago, the 
Russian aggression against Ukraine was beginning – the greatest 
challenge to European peace and security since the end of the Cold 
War.” (p. 1) 
 
“State violations in the east and state breakdowns in the south also 
have repercussions for Sweden. They lead to tension in our 
neighborhood, flows of refugees and a growing proportion of our 
population who bear the painful memories of war and conflict.” (p. 1) 
 
“We welcome the fact that the European Union has presented a united 
response to the developments in Russia and Ukraine. Sweden will 
continue to strive for a policy that is as clear in its demands for respect 
for international law as in its support for the right of every country to 
determine its own future. We support the efforts being made right now 
to find a political path towards easing tensions. And perhaps most 
importantly: we must help Ukraine to be successful, just as we will 
contribute to the continued development of the EU’s Eastern 
Partnership as a lever for those countries that have chosen the 
European path, whereby bloodshed on the battlefield is replaced with 
patience at the negotiating table.” (p. 1) 
 
“Sweden’s security policy remains firmly in place. Threats to peace 
and to our security are best averted collectively and in cooperation 
with other countries. Sweden does not participate in any military 
alliance. It is impossible to imagine military conflicts in our region 
that would affect only one country. Sweden will not remain passive if 
another EU Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an 
attack. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is 
affected. Our country must therefore be in a position to both give and 
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receive support, civilian as well as military. While the situation in our 
neighborhood makes it necessary to strengthen Sweden’s defense 
capabilities, we are continuing to develop our military cooperation: 
with Finland, with our other Nordic neighbors, with the Baltic 
countries and with NATO. In the latter case we, together with Finland 
and others, are now taking new steps as part of an upgraded 
partnership. Sweden will continue its active engagement and 
participation in international operations under the aegis of the UN, the 
EU, NATO and the OSCE.” (p. 2) 
 
“Together with other members of the UN, the EU, the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe, we defend the human rights that apply to every 
individual. We do so wherever these rights are attacked, and 
regardless of whether the people affected are in a magazine’s editorial 
office or a supermarket in Paris, in a market in Nigeria, or on an 
idyllic island in Norway. International law demands respect for the 
Charter of the United Nations and for the principles of territorial 
integrity and prohibition of violence enshrined in it. Genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and other serious international crimes 
must be combated and punished. The work of the International 
Humanitarian Law Delegation must be reinforced, and should also 
focus on disarmament. Safeguarding human rights is a cornerstone of 
Swedish foreign policy. A strategy for human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law is now being drafted.” (p. 3) 
 
(Regeringen 2015-02-11, p. 1-3) 
 
Analysis  
 
Not only is the tone throughout the declaration rather different now, 
but there is also a lot more being said about the situation and 
relationship between Russia and West. Now the insecurity is “greater” 
than before and this is considered to be the “greatest challenge to 
European peace and security since the end of the Cold War”. The 
initial fear for European security has escalated. Increased tension and 
instability are problems which Sweden faces in the future, and extra 
emphasis is put on international law and Swedish peace. The liberal 
tone is largely visible which is used to motivate Swedish action if it 
would go in a military direction with clear alliances with West. The 
occurrences in Ukraine are framed as signs of instability not only in 
that region itself, but to Sweden and its neighborhood and the entire 
EU needs to act together to face this security threat.  
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“Safeguarding human rights is a cornerstone of Swedish foreign 
policy. A strategy for human rights, democracy and the rule of law is 
now being drafted.” (Regeringen, 2015, p. 3) 
 
This line of argumentation is a clear construct of liberal values 
motivating behavior which is framed in a light which justifies one’s 
position. Now fearmongering also comes into play. The frame is 
clearly connecting Russian activity with Swedish insecurity which 
requires that Sweden increase their security. This can be done with 
both increased military capability and/or military alliances, and the 
latter is openly on the table in the declaration. It now serves Swedish 
national interest to potentially make moves which redefine its neutral 
position to actually taking sides. This first and foremost needs to have 
domestic support, and the rhetoric used in this declaration is deftly 
made in a diplomatic manner which could indeed motivate future 
alliance and side taking. If the Swedish population would think that 
Russia constitutes a real and active threat, then it would also be 
willing to allow more money spent on defense because they anticipate 
that it is necessary to manage future events according to prospect 
theory. The political elite are no fools, they do realize that they 
actively need to change the public opinion regarding their policies, 
and therefore these theories explain how leaders think and act when 
writing these declarations. But political elites still don’t intentionally 
create these opinions for selfish reasons, but because it serves the 
national interest. 
4.1.5 Articles 
 
Two large Swedish news sources will be used in order to recognize to 
which extent there has been media reporting about Russia posing a 
military threat to Sweden over the years and what is being said. I will 
use SVT’s and DN’s Internet search engine in order to both be able to 
divulge the number of articles regarding the topic and during which 
time these are posted, and select a few in order to further analyze the 
content. I will use the words “Ryssland militär hot Sverige” in the 
search, which means “Russia military threat Sweden”. The texts will 
be analyzed in the same way as the declarations of foreign policy. 
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4.1.6 2005 
 
Media reporting’s from SVT and DN regarding Russian military 
activity in relation to Sweden during this year is nonexistent.  
4.1.7 2006 
 
“Ryssland rustar upp vid Östersjön” 
For the first time since fall of the Soviet Union Russia is increasing its 
military capability. Swedish military and politicians have not 
perceived Russia as a threat during the last 10 years, but now Russia is 
getting stronger each year and will continue to do so according to the 
Swedish Defense Research Agency (SDRA). Sweden needs to prepare 
and be able to meet Russian military influence on Swedish security. It 
is also mentioned that Russia is seeking increased influence in the 
future, this is already being done by using their control over supplies 
of energy resources, which can be compared to extortion in order to 
gain increased power over old Soviet states (DN 2006-01-21).  
 
Analysis 
 
SDRA is a government agency who does research regarding questions 
of security and defense which is reported to the Ministry of Defense. 
This kind of information does put Russia in a suspicious position from 
a Swedish standpoint. It is clear that Sweden in accordance with this 
line of argumentation has incentive to prepare for the Russian threat. 
Russia is indeed perceived as a potential threat, not as a potential 
partner or a country of good will, but rather as a suppressor who is 
ambitious of power. This is the only article which can be found from 
2006 regarding Russia posing a threat to Sweden.  
4.1.8 2007 
 
“Min efterträdare är uppenbarligen okunnig” 
This article considers whether Russia is a potential threat in the future 
or not, and if Swedish officials should prepare for such a threat. It 
becomes clear that Russia is something to be included in the 
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calculations when forming Swedish foreign policy. But the article as 
whole does not focus on Russia, but criticize the new Minister of 
Defense. It is stated that the current situation in the world is relatively 
stable and peaceful (DN 2007-12-16).  
 
Analysis 
 
There is no clear intention that Russia should be focus of Swedish 
foreign policy, but Russia is still framed as a potential threat in the 
future. Russia isn’t posed as a partner, but is neither posed as an active 
military threat. 
4.1.9 2008 
 
“Sverige avbryter militära kontakter med Ryssland” 
Emphasis here is put on a weak Russia which is going to increase their 
military capability and the Russian invasion of Georgia. In this article, 
the tone of the statements of the Swedish politicians, Fredrik Reinfeldt 
and Carl Bildt, are seemingly restrained regarding the situation. They 
don’t draw any conclusions that this would be of importance to 
Sweden or that this is a threat which is necessary to address (DN 
2008-08-18). 
 
Analysis 
 
Here the situation is framed by the politicians in a light which is calm 
of character. Although the Russian activity could’ve erupted into a 
military campaign in Sweden, it didn’t raise as much concern. Russia 
is still an active nation with a future which can pose a threat to 
Sweden, but at the time this is not the case. The officials aren’t 
inclined to frame Russia as the enemy, but certainly condemn their 
behavior in Georgia. But this is nothing which is in the interest of 
Sweden to react to in any other way than politically at the time.  
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4.1.10   2009 
 
“Dags för Sverige att rusta upp mot Ryssland” 
Former Minister of Defense, Björn von Sydow, comments on the 
democratic decline in Russia, the invasion of Georgia, and the 
violation of international law as signs for Sweden to increase its 
military strength. Russian behavior is unpredictable and must be 
addressed in future strategies of the West. NATO must put military 
pressure on the Russian border and control this unpredictable nation 
by it. Sweden is currently too weak to manage the threat, and its 
defense must be upgraded and put more attention the future threats 
(DN 2009-01-18). 
 
Analysis 
 
This article has the kind of argumentation which frames Russia as a 
threat which Sweden need to address. Fearmongering about the future 
is remarkably visible in this article and the frame is clear as well. 
There is little in the article which would imply a possible partnership 
between Sweden and Russia or a positive future. It is assumed that the 
future will be troublesome, and that Sweden (and the West) needs to 
be prepared for the upcoming threat. 
4.1.11   2010 
 
“Försvarsledningen i fyra regioner” 
The at the time current Minister of Defense, Sten Tolgfors, comments 
on changes in the defense and notes that the Swedish defense budget 
might be experiencing cuts, but that is still adequate to manage any 
possible threat which Russia might pose, indicating that Sweden can 
take care of themselves which the current weak Russia (DN 2010-07-
11).  
 
Analysis 
 
Russia is framed as a weak state which does not currently pose a 
threat to Sweden which it cannot manage. There is no incentive to 
increase the military strength of Sweden or to rally to a Western 
alliance.  
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4.1.12   2011 
 
“Så marscherar Putin mot ett nytt tsarvälde” 
Although negotiations regarding disarmament are being brokered 
between USA and Russia, Russia is increasing its military capability 
while denying human rights and those who are critical of the current 
regime are being harassed according to Swedish politician 
representing the moderate party Mats Johansson. Concern regarding 
the balance of power in the neighborhood of Russia and Sweden is 
expressed. Russia is perceived to be trying to gain its superpower 
status once again, both with economic strength and a new foreign 
policy so put pressure on old Soviet states and West (DN 2011-02-09).  
 
Analysis 
 
Framing here puts Russia in an illiberal light and is very much 
perceived as a potential threat in the future, if not for certain 
considering Russian ambition. Johansson highlights their 
undemocratic society and illiberal actions, which connects to liberal 
lies and fearmongering. This is the only article of its kind during 2011. 
4.1.13   2012 
 
“Risken med ett öppet förhållande” 
Sweden feels more drawn to NATO, but can only join if Sweden do so 
with broad consent. The Russian general Makarov declared that a 
Finnish membership in NATO would be perceived as a threat, but the 
rest of Scandinavia does agree that a changed foreign policy is needed 
in order to be able to manage the Russian threat. But so far Sweden is 
more neutral in their actions than their neighbors Denmark and 
Norway (DN 2012-07-22).  
 
Analysis 
 
Russia is a potential threat and Swedish future regarding military 
action and alliances are put into question. Sweden is ambivalent in its 
behavior and the future direction of their policies is discussed. 
  25 
4.1.14   2013 
 
“Ryska bombplan övade anfall mot Sverige” 
Russian bomb and pursuit-planes were reported active close to the 
Swedish airspace border at the Gotland. According to The Swedish 
Armed Forces (TSAF), the Russian planes were exercising and do not 
constitute a real threat, since there is nothing new with this kind of 
exercise. According to Anders Silwer from TSAF, this should not be 
interpreted as a threat. Swedish military planes were not prepared to 
meet the Russian planes, but NATO planes were ready to meet the 
Russians (SVT 2013-04-22) 
 
Analysis 
 
TSAF do indeed tell the public in their statement that this should not 
be perceived as a threat, but if that is the case it would be unnecessary 
to report such happening to the media, since this kind of exercise is 
nothing new according to them. This kind of frame is diplomatic in 
tone, since it does not label Russia as an active threat, but to report 
this kind of activity when it hasn’t been relevant to do so before is 
noteworthy.  
 
“Rysslands maktambitioner har inga nationella gränser”  
This article argues that Russian interest is not restricted to its 
neighboring countries, but believes that Russia wants to extend their 
power to Europe. This would not be done militarily, but with 
economic and political power which the EU must be cautious of and 
together handle the influential waves the coming years with clear 
demands which Russia must adapt to. Russian business and political 
relationships foster corruption, bad values and must be prevented. At 
the end of the article it is argued that Europe must be prepared 
militarily to withstand Russian threats and claims of power. This 
article is written by Gunnar Hökmark, sitting in the European 
parliament representing the moderate party of Sweden (DN, 2013-03-
19). 
 
Analysis 
 
Russia is framed as a bad influence and an unfavorable partner which 
is to be approached with caution. This line of argumentation doesn’t 
put Russia in the military offensive light, but it does frame them as 
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both corrupt and potentially dangerous. They are a threat in some 
sense, but still not an adversary. The impression of the article is that 
Europe stands for liberal and therefore correct values, and Russia is 
the opposite. Liberal lies and fearmongering therefore used throughout 
the article, but not to the extent as to pose Russia as an active threat to 
anyone, and certainly not to Sweden.  
4.1.15   2014 
 
“Sverige har utsatts för grov kränkning” 
During 2014, an article was posted by DN with a headline which 
translates into “Sweden has been exposed to coarse violation”. 
Commander in chief Sverker Göransson announced in this article that 
a foreign submarine had violated Swedish borders, and that this 
behavior was unacceptable. The Swedish Armed Forces tells the press 
that the nationality of the submarine is yet to be confirmed. Later in 
the article it is mentioned that Russia is the one who is guilty of the 
violation. But during a press conference at this time, Russia isn’t 
mentioned, not even as a suspect. Prime Minister Stefan Löfven 
explains that this is because they only tell the press information they 
know for certain is true. Still, this occurrence is taken with great 
seriousness and is marked as a threat (DN 2014-11-14).  
 
Analysis 
 
One might argue that since the submarine isn’t officially declared as 
Russian, the information about the threat which the officials release to 
the public isn’t as influential on the opinions of potential threats as it 
could have been. But even if the officials won’t label the submarine as 
Russian, the rest of the information which is released does raise 
concern regarding the future either way, which motivates an increased 
military budget. Also, one should not forget that Sweden doesn’t 
consider any other country in the region as an active threat, and the 
conclusion which anyone will be likely to make is that the submarine 
is Russian because of the already high number of Russian military 
activity reporting. They don’t need to label the submarine or any other 
military activity as Russian simply because the way they frame and 
fearmonger the situation, everyday citizen is likely to draw the 
conclusion that the submarine is Russian on their own which in turn 
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connects to prospect theory and willingness to increase military 
capacity.  
 
“UD: Rysk kränkning av svenskt territorium” 
The ministry of foreign affairs released information regarding two 
Russian aircraft which violated Swedish airspace. The current 
Swedish minister of foreign affairs, Carl Bildt, called it the most 
serious Russian violation of airspace during his time as minister. 
TSAF labeled the occurrence as not likely being a mistake, but 
intentional. At the end of the article, two earlier violations of Swedish 
airspace made by other countries than Russia (USA and Poland) are 
mentioned, but are either labeled as not constituting a threat and/or 
mistakes (SVT 2014-09-20).  
 
Analysis 
 
The distinction made between airspace violations made by Russia and 
those made by other countries are evident. Russian violations are 
framed as a threat to Sweden, and the others are not. The information 
about the Russian violations are hyped and are according to framing 
theory and fearmongering creating opinions of how Russia now 
potentially constitutes an active military threat which needs to be 
managed according to the national interest.  
4.1.16   2015 
 
“Ryskt flyg “hotade” amerikanskt plan över Östersjön” 
A Russian military plane threatened an American scout plane at the 
Östersjön area according to the American Department of Defense 
(ADD). According to the TSAF, there were no Swedish aircraft 
nearby, and more Russian military air units have been spotted flying 
over international water in Östersjön lately. This increased number of 
air units often flies close to Swedish borders without signaling to 
Swedish officials. The five Nordic countries collectively agreed to 
increase their defense capability and cooperation in order to manage 
the rising Russian threat (SVT 2015-04-11).  
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Analysis 
 
Russia is framed as military active and an aggressor which needs to be 
managed. It is framed as a problem on an international level which 
breaks the peaceful relation. This is a clear case of fearmongering 
which supports the idea of increased military capability and alliances 
for Sweden.  
 
“Expert varnar för ryskt hot mot Gotland” 
The Minister of Defense, Peter Hultqvist and the Commander in Chief 
Sverker Göransson comments on the Russian military activity and the 
defense budget. Hultqvist expressed that Sweden needs to address 
these matter of security in order to be prepared for the future. A 
British defense expert named Keir Giles warns that Russia could be 
invading Gotland within 2 years and that the situation is really tense 
between the countries (DN 2015-04-28).   
 
Analysis 
 
The message of the officials is pretty straightforward. The frame and 
the fearmongering is similar to earlier articles but is now going as far 
as anticipating a Russian invasion. This kind of rhetoric is sure to 
develop further concern regarding Russian activity which connects to 
prospect theory and increased money spent on defense. 
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4.1.17   Media statistics 
 
Amount of articles regarding Russia as a military threat to 
Sweden over time (DN and SVT) 
 
2005: 0 
2006: 1 
2007: 3 
2008: 8 
2009: 3 
2010: 3 
2011: 2 
2012: 4 
2013: 19 
2014: 73 
2015 (May): 13 
 
Without sorting out which articles are relevant or not from the search 
(with the same search words), other newspapers such as Aftonbladet 
and Expressen also have a clear increase in news reporting during the 
last years. 
 
Aftonbladet 
 
2005: 15  
2006: 15  
2007: 10  
2008: 20  
2009: 11  
2010: 12  
2011: 20  
2012: 15  
2013: 73  
2014: 91  
2015 (May): 32  
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Expressen 
 
2006: 1  
2007: 7  
2008: 2  
2009: 5  
2010: 5  
2011: 3  
2012: 2  
2013: 11  
2014: 20  
2015 (May): 5  
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5 Discussion 
In this study in particular it is clear that in the last couple of years 
when Russia is the topic of discussion, it is seldom that their military 
capability and threatening nature isn’t mentioned. Earlier it has mostly 
been discussions regarding their development of a democratic society, 
liberal values and ties to the West. The statistics alone tell us that 
Russian activity has become more relevant in the media than before. 
But the research question requires a discussion regarding the change 
which Sweden has endured also regarding the content. Even in the 
first years which were analyzed in the media framed Russia as a 
potential threat, although not to the extent and not as big a threat as in 
the last couple of years. In the declarations there is clear change over 
time regarding how Russia is framed, from positive the first year to a 
potential enemy which Sweden needs to be careful of.  
 
The number of times it has been reported and the content of the 
information tell us that the Swedish state has chosen to release 
information and become more active regarding putting Russia in a bad 
light. The framing model (Fig. 1) becomes relevant to see how this is 
done intentionally to change opinions. According to this theoretical 
framework, the extent and content is released in order to “help” people 
come to the conclusion that Russia is a threat which needs to be 
addressed and increased military capability will be needed to face 
future challenges. As Mearsheimer’s theories tell us, this 
fearmongering and liberal rhetoric is used because it serves the 
national interest. Lying, spinning, and concealing information to the 
advantage of this interest is according to these theories because it will 
garner the support for increased military capability and make it 
possible to affiliate to Western alliance’s such as NATO if needed. 
This kind of logic gains further support from prospect theory. In times 
of crisis and fear for great loss, people will be more prone to support 
these kinds of policies both politically and economically. When the 
Swedish people fully appreciate the Russian threat, they will also 
support the policy changes.  
 
In accord with this paper’s indicia way of argumentation, I would 
argue that there is indeed a clear change in Swedish state attitude and 
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behavior in relation to Russia. The last couple of years have shown 
clear increase in reports of Russian military activity which often are 
labeled as dangerous and often make the Russians seem unpredictable. 
This is not to say that this isn’t the case, but I would argue that this 
has been the case all the time considering the nature of international 
relations. The difference between 2005 and 2015 is that Russia now is 
indeed increasingly active and shows its true colors, while back in 
2005 there was reason to believe that Russia could choose a road 
which lead to closer ties to West and liberal values.  
 
The reason why Russia became more militarily active is another 
question, but nevertheless have the Russians shown that they have 
interests which does not go hand in hand with West, otherwise the 
relationship would have been of different character and the media 
reports would have a different frame. It has become relevant for 
Sweden to implement a media strategy which allows domestic support 
for increased military capacity and potential alliances to develop to be 
able to manage the Russian threat. This is reflected in the overtime 
increased hostile language in the frame which is used in the articles. 
Russia goes from being a general threat to being an active threat with 
specific occurrences reported consisting of military activity both close 
to the Swedish border and beyond the border labeled as intentional 
violations. The number of these media reports increased greatly as the 
statistics tell us, and according to prospect theory this will provide the 
state of Sweden the support needed to manage future threats. Out of 
little acorns grow huge oaks.  
 
This paper have a few disadvantages. For instance, it can’t draw any 
conclusion without the theories and premises at hand, which other 
papers might be able to do with more information in the future. Future 
studies which provide different perspective and perhaps deeper insight 
could both be of extensive and intensive character. For instance, it 
would be interesting and largely contributing if one could conduct 
interviews with Swedish officials regarding this subject in order to 
understand the individualistic perspective which influences the 
structures of the political process, and maybe receive more 
information regarding how the leaders work with a media strategy. 
This would require another operational indicator which studies the 
same puzzle. Other studies could also focus on qualitative data in 
order to see Swedish foreign policy from a broader timeline 
perspective with a larger generalizing ambition which further confirms 
a long term media strategy. Studies done in the future when more 
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information is available, maybe even inside information, can 
complement, confirm and/or reject explanations. This has earlier been 
the case in the Cuba crisis for instance, which has provided 
comprehensive insight in the process of decision making.  
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6 Conclusion 
It is evident that there is an increased amount of released information 
and changed frame regarding the Russian relation to both Sweden and 
the West. The change has gone from potential partner and a hopeful 
future to a potential enemy and a dangerous and unpredictable future. 
The situation is now framed as demanding increased military capacity 
in the defense of Sweden. The Swedish state has according to the 
theoretical framework implemented a media strategy intentionally 
because it fosters support for increased military capacity and potential 
alliances with West which serves the national interest.  
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